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1. Introduction 
 
The debate on electricity rates is as old as the industry itself as illustrated by a paper 
from the end of the 19th century (Hopkinson, 1892).1 The central issues in this debate have 
always been revenue adequacy, economic efficiency and distributional effects, both between 
sectors, like residential-services-industry, and between large and small consumers within 
each sector. With respect to the rate structure, the discussion is about the respective weights 
on the fixed part, the peak demand related part (demand charge) and the part related to 
consumption (energy rate). Many countries today have settled for a combined demand 
charge (or Hopkinson tariff) and energy rate for industry and services, and a pure energy rate 
for households (Berg and Savvides, 1983). Energy rates for all sectors may either be constant 
the entire year, or vary through the day or the year, with typically three or four different rate 
levels. 
A number of developments appear to have initiated a renewed interest in rate structures: 
• Unbundling of generation, supply and distribution of electricity. 
• Increased cost awareness as a result of competition (in generation and supply) and 
stricter regulation (in distribution). 
• Focus on demand flexibility as a requirement for well-functioning power markets. 
• Focus on demand reduction as one of the measures to reduce GHG emissions. 
• Dramatic decrease in the cost of metering technology. 
 
These developments give motivation for more variable rates with stronger incentives to 
adapt demand to the varying conditions in the power system. Increased cost awareness 
should motivate suppliers to reduce peak demand, because their supply contracts normally 
only cover base load or expected peak load. In cases of extreme peak demand, the deficit 
must be bought in the day ahead or balancing markets at potentially very high prices. Cost 
awareness in distribution can make grid companies see peak demand reduction as an 
alternative to increased grid capacity. The importance of increased demand elasticity for 
well-functioning power markets has been acknowledged by Schweppe et al. (1988). It has 
been discussed in Stoft (2002) and in several other papers (e.g. Bompard et al., 2007 and 
Bruno et al., 2006). The issue of greenhouse gas emissions has generally increased the focus 
on demand efficiency. Finally, the decrease in the cost of technology has made hourly or 
                                                     
1 An overview of the early debate is given in Hausman and Neufeld (1984) and a discussion is also found in Byatt 
(1963). 
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even shorter metering intervals a realistic option. While the cost of metering until recently 
was the major obstacle for the use of more dynamic and cost-reflective rates, several large 
and many small power companies and countries have now introduced Advanced Meter 
Reading (AMR) or plan to do so. The most notable example is Italy, with 30 million meters 
(Botte et al., 2006). Also Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands have decided to go for full 
scale AMR. As a result of these developments, soon there will be no technological or cost 
barriers against the introduction of more dynamic and cost-reflective rates. 
Several alternative rate types that provide peak reducing incentives have been 
reported in the literature, such as the Time Of Use (TOU) pricing, Real-Time Pricing (RTP) 
and Critical-Peak Pricing (CPP) (Herter, 2007). With a TOU rate, prices vary across periods 
within a day or seasonally, but are predetermined and thus static and predictable. With RTP, 
the consumer price tracks the price in the power market, normally the day-ahead prices, and 
is therefore changing from hour to hour. CPP rates augment the static nature of a time-
invariant or TOU rate structure with a state dependent “critical” price during periods of 
system stress, typically in a limited number of hours annually. CPP can be seen as a 
compromise between the static properties of TOU and the variability of RTP, and is 
increasingly implemented for business (Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 2008 and 
Southern California Edison, 2008) and residential consumers (Gulf Power, 2008). However, 
the lack of hourly metering has until recently been a major obstacle for the wide spread use 
of such tariffs. 
Electricity consumers in the household sector in Norway have traditionally only paid 
for their energy consumption. However, the major share of the grid costs depends only on 
the maximum demand.2 This is because most of the costs are directly related to the capacity 
of the grid, which must be large enough to transport the total demand peak, which occurs 
only during a couple of hours each year. In Norway this will be during severe colds, due to 
the high penetration of electrical heating. A cost reflective tariff would therefore include a 
term related to peak demand. This can reduce grid costs, if consumers reduce their peak 
demand by flattening their consumption pattern in response to the prices. 
In the present research, we look at a demand charge (DC) grid tariff for residential 
consumers. Demand charges are of a static character, as they generally charge the highest 
demand peaks at a predetermined rate, and therefore do not convey the correct marginal 
price signals (Schweppe et al., 1988). However, they give a potentially strong incentive to 
reduce “needle peaks”, i.e. relatively short periods of extreme demand, typically occurring 
                                                     
2 After the deregulation of the Norwegian electricity market in 1991, vertically integrated power companies were 
separated into generating, trading and grid divisions or split up in separate companies. Customers now face a grid 
tariff from their local grid company, and a power tariff from a power supplier, which can be freely chosen from a 
number of competing companies. 
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during periods of extremely low temperatures (in the case of electric heating). The general 
rationale for a demand charge tariff is that the dominating share of the grid costs are fixed 
costs that are directly dependent on peak demand. For a grid owner, it is therefore of interest 
to investigate the response of residential consumers to a DC tariff. DC tariffs are common in 
the commercial sector, but we are not aware of literature reporting their use in the residential 
sector.  
This paper analyses data from a Norwegian grid company, Istad Nett AS (INAS), 
that introduced a DC tariff for its residential electricity customers in 2000. We estimate the 
consumption reductions from the households due to the DC tariff, using a panel data model 
with fixed effects. Such estimates are useful information for companies that want to 
anticipate the load reduction potential in their area. All the consumers had hourly automatic 
meter reading, and we use a panel data set of hourly consumption measurements from 443 
households for 2006. We also control for other important factors that influence consumption, 
using data on the power price (spot prices) that the consumers paid with respect to their 
power contracts, the number of hours of daylight per day and measurements of hourly 
average temperatures and wind speeds. We find that the consumers reduce consumption with 
up to 9 percent as a response to the tariff. However, we suggest that the reductions could 
have been even higher if consumers had received more information on their continuous 
consumption levels, and if they had been reminded more frequently of the type of tariff they 
had, and in which periods they were charged if their consumption became too high. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe the 
demand charge tariff and discuss the price signal given to the consumer. Section 3 describes 
the data that are analyzed and Section 4 describes the method and models that are used. The 
results from the regression analysis are evaluated in Section 5, and the last Section 
concludes. 
2. The demand charge tariff  
 
INAS has two grid tariff options for its residential consumers: 
• An energy tariff, with a fixed annual charge of 2300 NOK3 and a variable energy 
rate of 0.3366 NOK/kWh. 
• A demand charge tariff with an annual charge of 765 NOK, a variable energy rate of 
0.1789 NOK/kWh and a demand charge of 650 NOK/kW/year. 
 
                                                     
3 1 NOK ≈ 0.104 Euro (December 2008). 
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The demand charge is settled and billed on a monthly basis in the winter months 
December, January and February for highest registered hourly kilowatt consumption on 
working days between 7 am and 4 pm (hour 8 to 16). For the other months in the year, the 
average of the highest demand in each of the three winter months is billed. 
The DC tariff was introduced on a voluntary (opt-in) basis in 2000. The tariff was 
designed in such a way that if all consumers chose this tariff without changing their demand 
patterns, revenues for the grid company would be unchanged. The intention however, is that 
consumers do change their demand patterns by lowering their peak demand, decreasing their 
costs and at the same time decreasing the costs of the grid company by making it possible to 
postpone investments. The DC tariff is therefore attractive for consumers that are able to 
lower their peak demand to obtain a lower electricity bill. Note that in addition to the grid 
tariff, consumers also pay their power supplier for the power they use. The rate structure and 
actual price depend on the actual supplier and rate each consumer chooses. 
Although the DC tariff has only three parameters, its impact on the consumers’ 
marginal cost is not evident. To illustrate this we describe the tariff below. Denote the 
highest consumption on working days between 7 am and 4 pm Qi, the tariff fixed charge cgrid, 
demand charge m and energy rate h respectively, and monthly energy consumption qi for 
each month i. Then the monthly grid cost DCi is given by: 
 
i grid i iDC c hq mQ= + +    for i = 1,2,12   
and           (1) 
1 2 12
3i grid i
Q Q QDC c hq m + += + +    for i = 3,…,11, 
 
where the tariff data are given by cgrid = 69.8 NOK/month, h = 0.1789 NOK/kWh, m = 60.4 
NOK/kW/month4. 
 As we can see, the marginal price effect from a demand increase in January, 
February or December not only influences the bill the existing month, but also influences the 
bill for the whole year. The cost of this is m in month i and 1/3 of m in the 9 months March-
November, resulting in a marginal demand charge related cost of 
 
,
19 4
3DC i
C m m m= + ⋅ = ,        (2) 
 
                                                     
4 A tax rate equal to 0.115 NOK/kWh and VAT (24 percent) are included.  
 7
where the first term is caused by the immediate effects in the actual month for each of the 
three winter months, and the second by the effect this increase has in the nine other months. 
This means that if the maximum registered consumption increases by 1 kW in one of the 
winter months, the total price over the year does not increase by m (or 69.8 NOK), but with 
4m, which equals 241.6 NOK.  
This high cost is not necessarily obvious to a consumer, as the consumer is not 
confronted immediately on the bill with the whole effect of a consumption that increases the 
maximum registered peak, because this cost is also paid for in the nine other months. The 
price signal is thus difficult to assess because it is delayed, blurred and diluted. In addition, it 
is difficult for a household to know whether consumption in an hour will contribute to a 
higher maximum registered consumption than is registered from before, because the 
consumers do not have any information on the level of consumption. So although the DC 
tariff gives a general indication that peak demand is “expensive”, it is for most consumers 
probably not clear that the marginal cost of an increase in consumption during a few specific 
hours is as high 241.6 NOK/kWh. 
3. Data 
 
We use hourly electricity consumption data from a Norwegian grid company, INAX, 
that were collected from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2006. Our sample consists of 443 
consumers that have chosen both the network demand charge and a spot price power tariff.5 
In addition to the network demand charge tariff, we use data on the spot price, the 
temperature, hours of daylight per day and the wind speed. Figures 1 and 2 show the average 
daily spot prices in 2006, as well as the average hourly spot prices during the day for some 
selected months.6 To indicate the temperature and how it relates to consumption, Figure 3 
plots the average daily consumption vs. the average daily temperature for the customers that 
occur in the data set used in the analysis, and Figure 4 shows how average daily temperature 
and consumption changes during the year. Temperature and wind data were collected from a 
weather station situated in Molde, the largest town in INAS’ supply area. 
 
                                                     
5 Approximately 700 or about 5 percent of Istad Nett’s customers have chosen the DC grid tariff. We restrict our 
analysis to the customers that also chose a spot price power tariff, and that were without erroneous data 
registrations, i.e., 443 customers. By using these customers we can include the power price as an explanatory 
variable in the regression, because we have data on this price. 
6 The spot price rate the consumers were confronted with refers to the hourly Nord Pool spot price plus 0.025 
NOK/kWh. 
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Figure 1. Average daily Nord Pool spot prices 
in 2006 
 
Figure 2. Average hourly Nord Pool spot prices 
for selected months in 2006  
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Figure 3. Average daily consumption per 
household [kWh/h] plotted against the 
average daily temperature [°C] 
Figure 4. Average daily temperature [°C] and 
average daily consumption [kWh/h] 
 
As we can see from Figures 1 and 2, the spot prices in august were very high. This 
was caused by an especially dry hydrological situation, and the price movements in 2006 
were non-typical. Figures 3 and 4 clearly illustrate the importance of the ambient 
temperature for demand, showing that demand with an average daily temperature of –7 ºC is 
about three times the demand with a temperature of 20 ºC. In Figure 3 we can see a slight 
flattening at both ends of the temperature scale, which may indicate that when the 
temperature is very low, consumers tend to switch to alternative heating sources, and when it 
becomes high, there is no need for room heating and electricity is used only for lighting, 
food preparation, water heating etc.7 This effect is further discussed in the next section. A 
summary of the temperature, wind speed, daylight and spot price data is shown in Table 1. 
 
                                                     
7 The use of air conditioning is not common in this area with normally moderate summer temperatures. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for consumption, spot price, temperature, wind speed and num-
ber of daylight hours 
Variable Mean Std dev. Min. Max.
Energy [kWh/h] 2.7 1.6 0 18.0
Spot price [NOK] 0.39 0.09 0.1 1.15
Temperature [°C] 8.2 6.7 –11.8 29.2
Wind speed [m/s] 3.2 2.2 0 18.3
Daylight [hours] 12.7 0 5.7 20.2
  
The variation in all variables is high, with average hourly consumption from 0 to 18 
kWh/h, spot prices from 0.1 NOK/kWh to 1.15 NOK/kWh, hourly temperatures from –12 to 
nearly 30 degrees Celsius (note that Figures 3 and 4 show average daily temperatures), 
Average hourly wind speeds up to 18 m/s are registered, and the number of hours of daylight 
per day varies between 6 hours up to 20 hours (INAS is situated in the middle of Norway 
which has long days during the summer). High wind speed tends to increase the need for 
room heating, while more hours of daylight reduce the need for lighting. 
4. Method and model 
 
The aim of this analysis is to quantify the effect of the DC tariff on household’s 
electricity consumption. We use a regression model formulated on panel data, that is able to 
predict hourly electricity consumption, and thus also able to capture the effect of the DC 
tariff. The panel dataset is analyzed using a fixed effects regression model (see Greene, 
2003, and Hsiao, 2003). The specification of the model is as follows: 
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i = 1,…,443, t = 1,...,8760, D = {tue, wed, thu, fri, sat, sun},  M = {jan, feb, mar, apr, may, 
jun, aug, sep, oct, nov, dec}, S = {oct-apr, may-sep}, P = {nov-mar, oct+apr, may-sep}  
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where: 
ity   = hourly electricity consumption [kWh/h] in hour t for household i; 
, ,DC k tD   = dummy variable for the hours in January, February and December when the 
demand charge is active, i.e., 1 if t is in hour k, 0 otherwise; 
tP  = spot price [NOK/kWh] in hour t; 
tT  = temperature [°C] in hour t; 
2
tT  = temperature, squared [°C]
2 in hour t; 
tTMA  = moving average of temperature in the previous 24 hours [°C] in hour t; 
2
tTMA  = moving average of temperature in the previous 24 hours, squared [°C]
2 in hour 
t; 
tW  = wind speed [m/s] in hour t; 
tWMA  = moving average of wind speed in the previous 24 hours [m/s] in hour t; 
tDL  = daylight variable, 1 between sunrise and sunset, 0 1tDL< ≤  in the actual 
hour of sunrise/sunset (dependent on the share of the hour with light), 0 
otherwise; 
,s tD  = dummy variable, 1 if t is in season s, 0 otherwise; 
, , ,wd p wdh tD  = dummy variable, 1 if t is in period p of the year and in hour wdh of a work 
day, 0 otherwise; 
, , ,we s weh tD  = dummy variable, 1 if t is in season s of the year and in hour weh of a weekend 
or holiday, 0 otherwise; 
,d tD  = dummy variable, 1 if t is in day d of the week, 0 otherwise; 
,m tD  = dummy variable, 1 if t is in month m, 0 otherwise; 
iγ  = fixed time-invariant effect for household i; and 
itε  = a genuine error term, assumed to be independently distributed across i and t 
with a constant variance. 8 
 
We use dummy variables to capture the average drop of consumption for each of the 
hours of the day when the DC tariff is active. Dummies are chosen for this because the 
                                                     
8 The Huber/White/sandwich estimator is used to obtain robust estimates of the asymptotic variance-covariance 
matrix of the estimated parameters (StataCorp, 2005). 
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demand charge is constant and either active or non-active, dependent on the time of year and 
day. Thus, we expect consumers to respond with a non-continuous behaviour. The 
parameters of particular interest for our analysis are therefore βDC8 – βDC16. To isolate the 
effect of the tariff, we also control for other important factors that may contribute to the 
customers’ electricity consumption pattern, the electricity spot prices, temperature, daylight 
and wind speed. These factors are discussed below. 
First, in addition to the households’ network contract, the households also pay a bill 
according to their power contract. All consumers in our sample have chosen hourly changing 
spot prices for their power contract. The power price we include in the regression consists of 
the hourly spot price (see Figures 1 and 2) plus a small constant fee which is the supplier 
profit. Furthermore, we include temperature, as the electricity consumption is strongly 
influenced by temperature changes because of the high penetration of electrical heating. 
Figure 3 shows the average daily consumption plotted against the average daily temperature 
for the customers in the analysis. Figures 1 and 3 illustrate the importance of the temperature 
variable: the price in September (day 243-273) is more than 50 percent higher than the price 
in June (day 151-181). However, with temperatures in June above 15 ºC and in September 
around 10 ºC, demand is significantly higher in September. This suggests that even if the 
high price in September in isolation should give incentives to a lower consumption than in 
June when the price is lower, the temperature effect outweighs the price effect. We can also 
see from Figure 3 that the consumption flattens out when the temperatures exceed 15 °C. 
There is also a flattening tendency for low temperatures. The relationship between 
temperature and electricity consumption can therefore be described by an s-formed curve, 
where the changes in electricity consumption flatten out for low and high temperatures. 
Other studies also suggest this non-linear relation (Ericson, 2006b, Granger et al., 1979, and 
Ramanathan et al., 1997). These effects are controlled for in the model by two squared 
terms: one for the winter period and one for the summer period. To obtain the s-curve, the 
coefficients of these terms should enter the model with opposite signs. It is also likely that 
there will be a delayed effect on consumption from changes in temperature because of the 
natural thermal inertia of buildings. We therefore include 24-hour arithmetic moving average 
terms. Since the effects will be different for the summer and the winter we have two sets of 
variables, one for summer (May to September) and one for the winter (October to April). 
 Wind speed may also have an influence on the demand for heating. Increased 
wind, increases heat loss in the building, and both an hourly and a 24-hour moving average 
of the wind speed are included in the model. It is reasonable to believe that the wind has a 
different impact on consumption during the summer months compared with the winter 
months. We have therefore divided the wind terms into a winter and summer period, where 
the periods are defined as described before. 
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 Finally, daylight has an influence on the electricity consumption as it decreases 
the need for electric light and electric heating. The hours with daylight are controlled for by 
dummy variables. We use one dummy variable for each month. The variable is 1 when the 
sun is up and 0 otherwise. We assume that all the customers face the same weather 
conditions, because they are situated in the same area.  
 Consumers have different needs for electricity at different times of the day due 
to the consumers’ lifestyle, and this dependency is typically repetitive from day to day. In 
Norway there are huge variations in climate between summer and winter, and this has also 
an impact on people’s lifestyle. As an example, many people go home from their work 
earlier during the summer. The consumption pattern of electricity and alternative fuel 
(typically wood-burning stoves) for heating purposes is also different during the year. A 
survey among about 1/3 of the households in this project revealed that 77 percent use both 
electricity and an alternative heating system, normally wood. It is well-known in Norway 
that people use wood in different ways. Some use wood as an additional source during the 
whole year, some only during the winter and others only during very cold periods as a 
“peaking” resource. The way the heating technologies are combined varies significantly 
between consumers, and the aggregate effect of this behaviour results in changes in the 
typical cyclical patterns. Due to these changes in cyclical patterns over the year, we have 
distinguished three separate sets of hourly dummy variables for the 24 hours of the working 
days and one for the 24 hours of the weekends and holidays. The three sets of dummy 
variables will control for: the winter season (November to March), the summer season (May 
to September) and the “transition” season, April and October. The transition period is 
modelled with separate dummies because this season is typically the time when people 
change their habits with respect to the use of their heating systems. To avoid perfect 
multicollinearity, the winter work day hour 01-, winter weekend hour 01-, Monday- and 
November dummy variables are excluded.  
Seasonal changes such as humidity, rain, snow and others are controlled for by 
monthly dummy variables. The effects of type of household, type of heating technology and 
number of household members are captured by fixed effects. 
5. Results 
 
The impact of the DC tariff on the electricity consumption is analyzed using the 
model given by (3). Table 3 shows some of the results from the fixed effects regression using 
Stata, the rest is shown in the appendix (Statacorp, 2005). 
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Table 3. Selected results from the fixed effects regression using (3) 9 
Coeff. Variables Explanation Estimate t-value p-value
βDC,8 DC8 Dummy, demand charge, hour 8 -0.269 -22.61 0.000
βDC,9 DC9 Dummy, demand charge, hour 9 -0.253 -20.22 0.000
βDC,10 DC10 Dummy, demand charge, hour 10 -0.159 -12.36 0.000
βDC,11 DC11 Dummy, demand charge, hour 11 -0.106 -8.24 0.000
βDC,12 DC12 Dummy, demand charge, hour 12 -0.075 -6.04 0.000
βDC,13 DC13 Dummy, demand charge, hour 13 -0.068 -5.48 0.000
βDC,14 DC14 Dummy, demand charge, hour 14 -0.066 -5.38 0.000
βDC,15 DC15 Dummy, demand charge, hour 15 -0.081 -6.79 0.000
βDC,16 DC16 Dummy, demand charge, hour 16 -0.124 -10.21 0.000
βP P Spot price -0.048 -3.45 0.001
βT ,oct-apr Doct-apr T Temperature, oct-apr -0.045 -84.18 0.000
βT2,oct-apr Doct-apr T2 Temperature, oct-apr, squared 0.000 1.92 0.055
βTMA,oct-apr Doct-apr TMA Temperature, moving average, oct-apr -0.033 -51.22 0.000
βTMA2,oct-apr Doct-apr TMA2 Temperature, moving average, oct-apr, squared -0.001 -22.91 0.000
βT,may-sep Dmay-sep T Temperature, may-sep -0.029 -23.79 0.000
βT2,may-sep Dmay-sep T2 Temperature, may-sep, squared 0.000 8.40 0.000
βTMA,may-sep Dmay-sep TMA Temperature, moving average, may-sep -0.071 -37.84 0.000
βTMA2,may-sep Dmay-sep TMA2 Temperature, moving average, may-sep, squared 0.001 16.34 0.000
βW,oct-apr Doct-apr W Wind speed, oct-apr 0.020 42.41 0.000
βW,may-sep Dmay-sep W Wind speed, may-sep 0.009 19.39 0.000
βWMA,oct-apr Doct-apr WMA Wind speed, moving average, oct-apr 0.032 55.14 0.000
βWMA,may-sep Dmay-sep WMA Wind speed, moving average, may-sep 0.014 16.91 0.000
βDL,jan Djan DL Daylight: January -0.114 -14.86 0.000
βDL,feb Dfeb DL Daylight: Febary -0.110 -16.21 0.000
βDL,mar Dmar DL Daylight: March -0.098 -15.86 0.000
βDL,apr Dapr DL Daylight: April -0.004 -0.76 0.448
βDL,mai Dmay DL Daylight: May -0.032 -5.69 0.000
βDL,jun Djum DL Daylight: June -0.020 -3.22 0.001
βDL,jul Djul DL Daylight: July -0.052 -8.74 0.000
βDL,aug Daug DL Daylight: August -0.071 -14.02 0.000
βDL,sep Dsep DL Daylight: September -0.047 -10.07 0.000
βDL,okt Doct DL Daylight: October 0.003 0.43 0.669
βDL,nov Dnov DL Daylight: November -0.034 -4.93 0.000
βDL,des Ddec DL Daylight: December -0.041 -5.47 0.000
  Constant   2.495 311.27 0.000
R-sq: within= 0.3739  F test that all u_i=0: 
between= 0.0001  F(169, 3876081)=12947.23 
overall= 0.2812  Prob > F= 0.0000 
                                                     
9 Note that the regressions are performed with the software Stata, which uses an alternative but equivalent 
formulation by introducing an intercept (see StataCorp, 2005 and Gould, 2001). The intercept represents the 
average value of the fixed effects. 
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Table 3 shows that most of the explanatory variables enter (3) very significantly. An 
F-statistic is used to test whether all the coefficients, except the intercept, are jointly zero or 
not. The hypothesis that they are jointly zero are rejected, indicating that the model has 
substantial explanatory power. 
The main parameters of interest are βDC8 – βDC16. These parameters indicate the effect 
of the demand charge tariff on consumption in each of the hours 8 to 16, on working days in 
January, February and December.  Their estimates are all significant and negative. The 
demand reduction in the different hours is presented in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. The average change in consumption per customer for each hour within the active 
window 
 
Figure 5 shows that the average reduction per household varies between 0.07 and 
0.27, kWh/h dependent on the hour. The largest load reductions occur in hour 8 and 9 in the 
morning. The result in hour 8 implies a reduction of 9 percent of the average consumer’s 
demand in that hour. The average reduction of demand due to the DC tariff for all the nine 
hours in the active window is 5 percent.  
We can also see from the figure that the effect of the DC tariff decreases in the 
middle of the day before it again rises in hour 15 and 16. There may be several explanations 
for this result. One possible explanation is that most people work during the day and that 
there is nobody present during the middle of the day, resulting in a smaller potential for 
demand reduction for these hours. Another possibility is that people are aware that their 
consumption is higher during the morning and afternoon, resulting in a higher potential 
saving. 
Assuming that 5 percent of the consumers in Istad Nett’s area that chose the DC 
tariff reduce consumption with 9 percent, the grid company may anticipate a total load 
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reduction in their area of up to nearly 0.5 percent.10 It would probably be possible to achieve 
a significantly higher response by providing the consumers with more information. The grid 
company did little effort to inform consumers because they hoped to find out if it was 
possible to reduce peak demand with low costs. It was hoped that the fact that consumers 
knew that prices were high during the daytime was sufficient to obtain a large reduction in 
demand. More and better information beyond what was implicit in the prices could have 
given stronger reactions. Examples are updated information on demand on the Internet or the 
actual expected marginal price through a display that could be placed at a central place in the 
home. With the DC tariff the price signal can be quite strong, as demonstrated in Section 2, 
but it is difficult for the consumers to know the real marginal price at any instant. If this price 
signal could be conveyed to the consumer, this would probably result in a much stronger 
response. 
For the other variables we find that the estimated power price coefficients indicate 
that if the price increases with 1 NOK, the consumption decreases with 0.05 kWh/h. This 
gives a power price elasticity approximately equal to –0.02.11 Ericson (2006a), also 
analysing Norwegian households’ price responses, found price elasticities in the interval       
–0.02 to –0.03 for customers with a TOU grid tariff and standard or spot price power 
contracts. Our result is thus quite similar. 
For the other parameters we can see that all the estimated temperature coefficients 
are significant. All the linear terms have negative signs. This indicates that consumption will 
increase if the temperature or the average temperature for the previous 24 hours drops from 
one hour to the next. Both the squared summer terms enter with positive estimates, resulting 
in a flattening out of demand at high temperatures, as expected. The squared average 
temperature for the previous 24 hours in the winter term enters with a negative estimate, 
which means that the consumption levels out when the average temperature the previous 24 
hours drops from one hour to another, which also corresponds to the physical reality. 
However, the sign of the estimate of the squared term for hourly winter temperatures is 
counterintuitive, although it is insignificant. The explanation may lie in the use of alternative 
fuel as discussed with respect to Figure 3. Probably a number of consumers actually use 
electricity in addition to an alternative fuel only when temperatures are low.  
The wind coefficient estimates are all positive and significant which indicates that 
electricity consumption increases with the wind speed. Furthermore, we see that the 
estimated effect of the wind is greater in the winter than in the summer, which is reasonable. 
                                                     
10 This assumes that also the customers that did choose the DC tariff, but did not choose the spot price tariff and 
those that had erroneous data (which are not included in the regression), respond similar to our findings. There 
could be some selections problems related to this, so this attempt to aggregate our findings is only indicative.  
11 We have assumed a linear price response and calculated the price elasticity by using average price (0.81 NOK) 
and electricity consumption (2.3 kWh/h) values.  
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Daylight variables enter negatively except in October, when the estimate is positive 
and significant. This indicates that more daylight will decrease electricity consumption as 
expected. 
6. Conclusions 
 
We have analysed the effect of a demand charge grid tariff on the electricity 
consumption for 443 Norwegian households. The tariff charges the maximum hourly peak 
consumption in each of the winter months, thus giving incentives to reduce peak 
consumption. We use a panel data model with fixed effects that is able to predict hourly 
electricity consumption, and to quantify the effect of the demand charge tariff. The analysis 
indicates a consumption reduction between 0.07 and 0.27 kWh/h, with the strongest effect in 
hour 8, and the weakest effect in the middle of the day. This variation is probably due to the 
fact that there normally are few or no people at home in many Norwegian households during 
the daytime. In hour 8, where the effect is strongest, the reduction is approximately 9 
percent, while the average reduction for all hours is approximately 5 percent. From all 
consumers in the grid company’s area choosing the DC tariff, this could represent up to 
nearly a 0.5 percent reduction of total load. 
The consumers did not receive any information on the continuous level of 
consumption they had. Neither were they provided with any reminders that the tariff was in 
effect and would charge their consumption if it was high enough. Presumably, the impact on 
the consumers’ behaviour could have been much stronger if the equipment had been set up 
differently, by for instance bringing the price signal and consumption level information to 
the consumers by a display.  
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Appendix: The rest of the results from the fixed effects regression 
Coeff. Variables Explanation Estimate t-value p-value
βwd, nov-mar, 2  Dwd, nov-mar, 2  Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 2 -0.187 -28.25 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 3 Dwd, nov-mar, 3 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 3 -0.272 -42.49 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 4 Dwd, nov-mar, 4 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 4 -0.273 -42.64 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 5 Dwd, nov-mar, 5 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 5 -0.257 -40.59 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 6 Dwd, nov-mar, 6 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 6 -0.150 -23.19 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 7 Dwd, nov-mar, 7 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 7 0.159 22.99 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 8 Dwd, nov-mar, 8 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 8 0.689 65.85 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 9 Dwd, nov-mar, 9 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 9 0.588 52.86 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 10 Dwd, nov-mar, 10 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 10 0.452 40.55 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 11 Dwd, nov-mar, 11 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 11 0.336 30.49 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 12 Dwd, nov-mar, 12 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 12 0.234 21.69 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 13 Dwd, nov-mar, 13 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 13 0.191 17.93 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 14 Dwd, nov-mar, 14 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 14 0.197 18.65 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 15 Dwd, nov-mar, 15 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 15 0.288 27.73 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 16 Dwd, nov-mar, 16 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 16 0.561 54.72 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 17 Dwd, nov-mar, 17 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 17 1.034 124.56 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 18 Dwd, nov-mar, 18 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 18 1.158 138.87 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 19 Dwd, nov-mar, 19 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 19 1.187 144.79 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 20 Dwd, nov-mar, 20 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 20 1.175 146.23 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 21 Dwd, nov-mar, 21 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 21 1.142 144.74 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 22 Dwd, nov-mar, 22 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 22 1.072 137.59 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 23 Dwd, nov-mar, 23 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 23 0.838 112.45 0.000
βwd, nov-mar, 24 Dwd, nov-mar, 24 Dummy, workday, November to March, hour 24 0.429 59.50 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 1 Dwd, oct+apr, 1 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 1 -0.007 -0.75 0.450
βwd, oct+apr, 2 Dwd, oct+apr, 2 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 2 -0.079 -9.07 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 3 Dwd, oct+apr, 3 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 3 -0.091 -10.45 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 4 Dwd, oct+apr, 4 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 4 -0.089 -10.48 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 5 Dwd, oct+apr, 5 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 5 -0.023 -2.65 0.008
βwd, oct+apr, 6 Dwd, oct+apr, 6 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 6 0.235 25.65 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 7 Dwd, oct+apr, 7 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 7 0.658 63.56 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 8 Dwd, oct+apr, 8 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 8 0.581 53.32 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 9 Dwd, oct+apr, 9 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 9 0.503 46.66 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 10 Dwd, oct+apr, 10 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 10 0.423 39.42 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 11 Dwd, oct+apr, 11 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 11 0.352 33.02 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 12 Dwd, oct+apr, 12 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 12 0.318 30.11 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 13 Dwd, oct+apr, 13 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 13 0.302 29.06 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 14 Dwd, oct+apr, 14 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 14 0.363 34.58 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 15 Dwd, oct+apr, 15 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 15 0.525 48.30 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 16 Dwd, oct+apr, 16 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 16 0.807 71.92 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 17 Dwd, oct+apr, 17 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 17 0.920 82.33 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 18 Dwd, oct+apr, 18 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 18 0.989 87.90 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 19 Dwd, oct+apr, 19 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 19 1.041 92.68 0.000
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Coeff. Variables Explanation Estimate t-value p-value
βwd, oct+apr, 20 Dwd, oct+apr, 20 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 20 1.084 96.96 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 21 Dwd, oct+apr, 21 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 21 1.088 99.48 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 22 Dwd, oct+apr, 22 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 22 0.930 88.90 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 23 Dwd, oct+apr, 23 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 23 0.594 59.18 0.000
βwd, oct+apr, 24 Dwd, oct+apr, 24 Dummy, workday, October plus April, hour 24 0.249 25.95 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 1 Dwd, may-sep, 1 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 1 0.108 8.54 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 2 Dwd, may-sep, 2 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 2 0.025 1.99 0.046
βwd, may-sep, 3 Dwd, may-sep, 3 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 3 -0.007 -0.60 0.547
βwd, may-sep, 4 Dwd, may-sep, 4 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 4 0.004 0.32 0.750
βwd, may-sep, 5 Dwd, may-sep, 5 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 5 0.046 3.69 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 6 Dwd, may-sep, 6 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 6 0.239 19.12 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 7 Dwd, may-sep, 7 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 7 0.567 44.75 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 8 Dwd, may-sep, 8 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 8 0.521 41.10 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 9 Dwd, may-sep, 9 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 9 0.484 38.13 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 10 Dwd, may-sep, 10 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 10 0.453 35.51 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 11 Dwd, may-sep, 11 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 11 0.421 33.05 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 12 Dwd, may-sep, 12 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 12 0.397 31.10 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 13 Dwd, may-sep, 13 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 13 0.395 30.93 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 14 Dwd, may-sep, 14 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 14 0.438 34.29 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 15 Dwd, may-sep, 15 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 15 0.583 45.21 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 16 Dwd, may-sep, 16 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 16 0.783 60.52 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 17 Dwd, may-sep, 17 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 17 0.830 63.92 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 18 Dwd, may-sep, 18 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 18 0.827 63.93 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 19 Dwd, may-sep, 19 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 19 0.856 66.36 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 20 Dwd, may-sep, 20 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 20 0.913 70.92 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 21 Dwd, may-sep, 21 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 21 0.926 72.05 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 22 Dwd, may-sep, 22 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 22 0.850 65.83 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 23 Dwd, may-sep, 23 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 23 0.633 49.15 0.000
βwd, may-sep, 24 Dwd, may-sep, 24 Dummy, workday, may-sep, hour 24 0.332 25.95 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 2 Dwe, oct-apr, 2 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 2 -0.225 -32.37 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 3 Dwe, oct-apr, 3 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 3 -0.330 -48.70 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 4 Dwe, oct-apr, 4 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 4 -0.365 -54.61 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 5 Dwe, oct-apr, 5 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 5 -0.361 -54.27 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 6 Dwe, oct-apr, 6 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 6 -0.312 -46.56 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 7 Dwe, oct-apr, 7 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 7 -0.218 -31.50 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 8 Dwe, oct-apr, 8 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 8 -0.085 -11.29 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 9 Dwe, oct-apr, 9 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 9 0.168 20.27 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 10 Dwe, oct-apr, 10 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 10 0.445 48.36 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 11 Dwe, oct-apr, 11 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 11 0.617 65.42 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 12 Dwe, oct-apr, 12 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 12 0.634 66.71 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 13 Dwe, oct-apr, 13 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 13 0.603 63.84 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 14 Dwe, oct-apr, 14 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 14 0.573 60.53 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 15 Dwe, oct-apr, 15 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 15 0.595 64.67 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 16 Dwe, oct-apr, 16 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 16 0.668 73.26 0.000
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Coeff. Variables Explanation Estimate t-value p-value
βwe, oct-apr, 17 Dwe, oct-apr, 17 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 17 0.783 84.69 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 18 Dwe, oct-apr, 18 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 18 0.860 93.17 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 19 Dwe, oct-apr, 19 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 19 0.896 97.45 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 20 Dwe, oct-apr, 20 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 20 0.870 96.94 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 21 Dwe, oct-apr, 21 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 21 0.779 90.24 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 22 Dwe, oct-apr, 22 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 22 0.635 77.74 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 23 Dwe, oct-apr, 23 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 23 0.430 55.08 0.000
βwe, oct-apr, 24 Dwe, oct-apr, 24 Dummy, weekend/holiday, oct-apr, hour 24 0.150 19.85 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 1 Dwe, may-sep, 1 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 1 -0.020 -2.18 0.030
βwe, may-sep, 2 Dwe, may-sep, 2 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 2 -0.119 -12.98 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 3 Dwe, may-sep, 3 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 3 -0.157 -17.69 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 4 Dwe, may-sep, 4 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 4 -0.159 -18.06 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 5 Dwe, may-sep, 5 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 5 -0.148 -16.93 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 6 Dwe, may-sep, 6 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 6 -0.112 -12.77 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 7 Dwe, may-sep, 7 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 7 -0.052 -5.86 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 8 Dwe, may-sep, 8 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 8 0.109 11.73 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 9 Dwe, may-sep, 9 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 9 0.299 30.51 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 10 Dwe, may-sep, 10 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 10 0.425 41.63 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 11 Dwe, may-sep, 11 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 11 0.409 39.56 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 12 Dwe, may-sep, 12 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 12 0.371 35.84 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 13 Dwe, may-sep, 13 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 13 0.337 32.62 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 14 Dwe, may-sep, 14 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 14 0.339 32.66 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 15 Dwe, may-sep, 15 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 15 0.351 33.56 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 16 Dwe, may-sep, 16 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 16 0.399 37.77 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 17 Dwe, may-sep, 17 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 17 0.463 43.31 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 18 Dwe, may-sep, 18 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 18 0.504 46.96 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 19 Dwe, may-sep, 19 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 19 0.527 49.15 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 20 Dwe, may-sep, 20 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 20 0.580 54.64 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 21 Dwe, may-sep, 21 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 21 0.537 51.83 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 22 Dwe, may-sep, 22 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 22 0.445 43.86 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 23 Dwe, may-sep, 23 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 23 0.311 31.37 0.000
βwe, may-sep, 24 Dwe, may-sep, 24 Dummy, weekend/holiday, may-sep, hour 24 0.122 12.57 0.000
βtue Dtue Dummy, Tuesday -0.003 -1.58 0.115
βwed Dwed Dummy, Wednesday -0.018 -8.68 0.000
βthu Dthu Dummy, Thursday -0.023 -10.97 0.000
βfri Dfri Dummy, Friday -0.014 -6.50 0.000
Βsat Dsat Dummy, Saturday 0.236 40.27 0.000
βsun Dsun Dummy, Sunday 0.258 43.94 0.000
βdec Ddec Dummy, January 0.384 100.71 0.000
βjan Djan Dummy, February 0.198 51.26 0.000
βfeb Dfeb Dummy, March 0.100 22.00 0.000
βmar Dmar Dummy, April -0.135 -25.24 0.000
βapr Dapr Dummy, May -0.305 -20.62 0.000
βmay Dmay Dummy, June -0.331 -21.21 0.000
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Coeff. Variables Explanation Estimate t-value p-value
βjul Djul Dummy, July -0.379 -24.07 0.000
βjun Djun Dummy, August -0.425 -26.96 0.000
βaug Daug Dummy, September -0.382 -24.40 0.000
βsep Dsep Dummy, October -0.300 -57.56 0.000
βoct Doct Dummy, December 0.160 42.45 0.000
 
 
 
 
 
 
